Sometimes, that’s not a good option, especially if playing against a quarterback who can use his legs but predominantly plays from the pocket.

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So what’s the best way to play defense against these quarterbacks and keep their legs from killing you without making it easier for them to throw from the pocket?

The Seahawks defense had a pretty good answer last season with their 4-man rush.

There were two key aspects to their approach. First, their pass rushers were conscious of not getting too far upfield, particularly on the edges. They rushed at the depth of the quarterback, helping to prevent the emergence of any escape lanes.

Second, they brought lots of stunts inside to create chaos in the middle, break down the O-line’s interior, and minimize the existence of any clean escape routes in front of the quarterback.

Let’s take a look at some examples below.

This first play comes from Seattle’s Week 9 win over the Commanders and is a perfect illustration of what I described above. This was a 4-man rush with a stunt in the middle and the edge rushers never getting past Jayden Daniels:

Of course this wasn’t a pass rush merely designed to contain Daniels and do nothing else. It was still meant to get to the quarterback.

Watch Leonard Williams (#99) deliver a powerful blow to the center, knocking him out of the middle. That allowed him to penetrate inside and get pressure on Daniels, who had nowhere to escape:

Take another look from the sideline angle to see the depth of those edge rushers:

You can see the Seahawks do the same thing against Kyler Murray on this sack:

Below is an example of another way that Seattle was able to get pressure inside and smother the quarterback.

This was a 3rd-and-9 against Trevor Lawrence and the Jaguars in Week 6. The Seahawks used a tilted front here with 3 down-linemen to the left of the center:

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Joe Burrow is among the best in the game at doing just that, as you’ll see on the example below.

In the Bengals’ Week 13 win over the Ravens last season, they faced a 3rd-and-9 from Baltimore’s 29-yard line in the 3rd quarter.

Cincinnati initially came out in a 2x2 formation with running back Samaje Perine on the perimeter and tight end Drew Sample next to Burrow in the backfield:

But Burrow saw the Ravens showing a pressure look with 7 defenders hovering near the line of scrimmage and an 8th potential rusher in the slot to his right:

Given the situation and defensive look, a blitz was likely. But it could be coming from either direction.

So Burrow brought Perine back in from the perimeter and moved Sample up just behind the center to account for it. He was keeping 7 in to protect:

The route concept the Bengals had called here was “Dagger” with just 3 receivers running routes:

Since the route concept was to the offense’s right, that meant Burrow’s eyes needed to go right at the snap as well.

In an ideal world, a quarterback does not want to have to peak in one direction and then get his eyes back to the other side in order to decipher the coverage and work through his reads. That adds time and can be hard to do.

So Burrow put Sample in the A-gap to the left and set the protection so that he was completely secure to his back side and wouldn’t have to peak in that direction:

But after Burrow set the protection, you can see the Ravens communicating and adjusting their blitz. The slot cornerback to the right, Marlon Humphrey, crept inside ready to rush:

That wasn’t a problem for Burrow.

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However, defenders are also human. They can get lulled into a pattern. In fact, the best defenders are always looking for opportunities to call out plays before they happen and stop the offense in its tracks.

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So it helps to feed them the same look over and over and over again, set up a tendency, and then pull the rug out from the defense at just the right moment using play-action.

In Super Bowl LX, Seahawks Offensive Coordinator Klint Kubiak did just that, patiently calling run after run out of the same looks before breaking tendency for a back-breaking touchdown.

The trend that Kubiak established early on, and then throughout the game, was that the Seahawks would run outside zone to the 2-tight-end side if they were in 12 or 13 personnel. They did it out of static looks and they did it off of motion.

It started on the very first play of the game. Watch Kenneth Walker III take this to the 2-tight-end side and pick up 10 yards to get the Seahawks offense going:

On these next two examples, Kubiak motioned his tight end across the formation and then ran outside zone to the 2-tight-end side.

But pay close attention to Patriots linebacker Jack Gibbens (#51) on both plays. Notice how he attacked downhill right at the snap when he saw the motion, ready to defend the run:

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This 3rd-and-9 on New England’s opening drive set the tone. Macdonald would bring a 5-man double-edge blitz that ultimately yielded a free rusher vs. a 6-man protection.

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One key to this pressure was that the Seahawks had Dime personnel (6 DB’s) on the field, and that enabled them to have speed off of both edges. The presence of speed allowed them to hold their disguise until the last moment and blitz from distance.

First, take a look at this from the sideline angle. The Patriots motioned to a 3x1 formation. The Seahawks responded with a 2-shell look pre-snap (as they did for most of the night), 5 men on the line of scrimmage, Devon Witherspoon in the slot far away from the pressure look, and safety Nick Emmanwori lurking off the edge to the other side:

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This one came against the Chargers on a 2nd-and-7 from L.A.’s own 29-yard line, which is an area of the field and a situation where you rarely see it.

First notice the Chiefs’ alignment against L.A.’s shotgun 1-back set. There are no hints that a cover-0 blitz is coming here:

There were two clues that the Chiefs might be bringing some kind of pressure, however. Linebacker Nick Bolton (#32) was hovering near the line of scrimmage. And to the offense’s right, the safety was stacked over cornerback Trent McDuffie (#22):

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In this breakdown, I’ll talk about Baker Mayfield’s 28-yard completion to Emeka Egbuka that set up the Buccaneers’ game-winning field goal against the Jets in Week 3 last season.

His ability to decipher the blitz and set the protection accordingly are what made this play possible.

This was a 2nd-and-10 with just 1:36 remaining and Tampa trailing 27-26. The Buccaneers started in a 3x1 but shifted to a 2x2 well before the snap:

Notice the Jets’ defensive look. They had 6 men on the line of scrimmage, including two linebackers in the A-gaps. And they had a slot-corner over Tampa’s #2 inside receiver to the right. He was also a potential blitz threat:

That clearly triggered something in Mayfield’s mind.

In fact, earlier in the game, the Jets had shown a similar look in another obvious passing situation (a 3rd-and-9). Notice the linebackers in both A-gaps and 6 men on the line of scrimmage on that play as well:

The Jets would bring pressure with the slot corner blitzing and the A-Gap linebacker to his side dropping out:

The Bucs protected this as illustrated below with the slot corner unaccounted for. Baker would have to throw hot off of him:

Mayfield’s hot throw was taken away by the coverage. Not to mention, the blitzing slot-corner was in his face, obstructing the throw. The Jets would drop Mayfield for a sack as a result:

Fast forward to that 2nd-and-10 on the Buccaneers’ final drive. The pressure look was similar, but it appeared the slot blitz would be coming from Mayfield’s right this time (note the safety’s position over him as a tell):

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Well, it kind of says it in the name. The defense simulates pressure or simulates a blitz (5 or more pass rushers) by giving a pre-snap presentation to the offense that makes it look like pressure is coming.

Ultimately, however, the defense will only rush 4. At least one of those 4 pass rushers will be a non-traditional rusher (e.g. a linebacker or defensive back).

Generally, the defense will try to bring 4 pass rushers in a way that is either difficult for the offense to pick up or creates advantageous 1-on-1’s (or leaves the offense vulnerable to stunts). And because only 4 are rushing, the defense is not sacrificing defenders in coverage. So just about anything can be played behind the pressure.

Sounds like the perfect defense, no? Often times, it is.

The examples below come courtesy of Packers Defensive Coordinator Jeff Hafley from Green Bay’s Week 7 win over the Texans last season.

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They can be great plays for picking up easy yards against the right look, particularly on early downs. Or, as was the case on this play below, they can be used as good answers for certain blitzes in obvious passing situations:

You can read about the sequence that led to the above completion and see how masterful Tom Brady was at the line of scrimmage here.

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I’m not going to lie to you, though, the arrow screen itself is not all that exciting. What is exciting, however, is how it can be used with bluffs or fakes to catch the defense with its pants down.

You can see an example of this below courtesy of Aaron Rodgers during the Packers’ 2022 Week 10 overtime win against the Cowboys.

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It might vary by opponent or situation, but by and large, the defenders in man coverage will play with outside leverage on routes between the numbers and funnel their receivers inside where the help is. Notice all three of the DBs on this particular example (in red) playing to their help in the middle:

Those help defenders try to read the route combination and the quarterback. Here, the hole defender was able to track the routes and the quarterback’s eyes and then make a play on the ball for the interception:

The Buccaneers offense used reduced splits on this play (receivers inside the numbers). But for an offense that aligns with receivers outside the numbers, the defenders matching up to them will generally play with inside leverage and use the sideline as their help:

On this example, let’s focus on those outside cornerbacks. Pre-snap, one was aligned inside and the other was aligned outside of his receiver. But both would ultimately play with inside leverage, taking away the middle of the field and forcing their receivers to the sideline:

The slot defenders inside the numbers would play with outside leverage, funneling their receivers to the middle:

This play was interesting, though, because the defender over the #3 inside receiver (safety C.J. Gardner-Johnson) wouldn’t follow his receiver inside. Instead, he let him go and the hole defender locked onto him:

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The concept is illustrated below:

The route that attacks downfield is traditionally a go-route (there are variations, which we’ll get into). The sail, which is a rounded-off out-route, attacks the intermediate level. The shallow route is generally anything that attacks the flat area. That can be done from the backfield (e.g. a flat route or swing route), via a receiver running a shallow crosser from the opposite side of the field, or from a quick out to the same side as the concept.

This first example is from the Eagles’ 2022 season with Shane Steichen as the offensive coordinator. Philadelphia would run the concept out of a 2x2 formation. The Steelers would rotate to a Cover-3 zone post-snap:

The go-route on the outside would hold the deep-third corner and the flat route coming out of the backfield would hold the flat defender. That left tight end Dallas Goedert running his sail-route into a vacated zone:

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It’s hard to find a better example of this than Week 2 of the 2024 season when Texans Head Coach DeMeco Ryans was able to torment Caleb Williams and the Chicago Bears with one blitz after another out of this front.

First, let’s take a look at the front so we can understand why it can be so effective. Notice the 3 defensive linemen positioned to one side of the center:

Multiple pass rushers to the 3-man side are often assured a 1-on-1 matchup out of this alignment.

When a 5th defender (a linebacker or safety) drops down onto the line of scrimmage, it often forces the O-line into man blocking and 1-on-1’s across the board. That makes it more difficult for the protection to handle any stunts since there’s no extra blocker to help out.

As you’ll see on the examples below, it was these 5-man tilted front looks that Ryans used over and over on this night to generate immense pressure.

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There are many variations and ways to get to it, but at its core, the play involves a wide receiver or tight end blocking down (cracking) on the EMOL and the tackle pulling around him to the outside.

More often than not, there are multiple receivers or skill-position players cracking, and sometimes there will be multiple players pulling. The hope is that getting the running back to the perimeter quickly will allow him to take advantage of space and create a big play.

In this breakdown, I’ll show you a standard example of toss crack, a variation where the offense used motion to create better blocking angles, and an example from the 2024 NFC Championship Game where the Eagles used personnel and formation to give themselves a huge advantage when executing the play.

Below, you can see one version of the concept illustrated:

The run is, for the most part, blocked like outside zone with the exception of the pin-and-pull action of the skill players on the perimeter and the pullers. Here, it gained an easy 7 yards on first down:

The great thing about the play is that it’s not dependent on the key players delivering devastating blocks or dominating the line of scrimmage (although both of those would certainly be preferred). Instead, it’s about angles.

You could see on the run above that the tight end cracking on the line of scrimmage finished 4 yards into the backfield and the receiver cracking to that side caught his man and was basically taken for a ride. The play still picked up 7 yards on a running down.

A big part of the play is the tackle getting matched up on a cornerback. Most corners (like #23 below) want absolutely no part of that and are more than happy to get the hell out of the way, widening the running lane:

You’ll often see teams run toss crack and try to get multiple blockers on the perimeter. Above, the Texans did so with a fullback out of the backfield. This next example, courtesy of Mike McDaniel and the Dolphins, used burst motion before the snap:

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One blitzer picks or blocks an offensive lineman, creating an alley for another blitzer to get through to the quarterback.

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This example comes courtesy of Mike Macdonald when he was the Ravens Defensive Coordinator in 2023.

This was a 3rd-and-10. Baltimore aligned with 6 potential pass rushers near the line of scrimmage. Linebacker Roquan Smith stood over the center, creating a 5-man surface:

The Jaguars matched up with their 5 offensive linemen accounting for Baltimore’s 5 defenders on the line of scrimmage. Running back D’Ernest Johnson would be responsible for linebacker Patrick Queen if he blitzed:

Now let’s take a look at the design of the stunt. Roquan Smith crossed the center’s face to the left at the snap, taking him with him:

Kyle Van Noy took his initial path to the right, taking right guard Brandon Scherff with him and splitting the middle wide open:

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One of the best examples of a team having success with this tactic occurred during the 2023 NFC Wild Card Playoffs. Packers Head Coach Matt LaFleur called split zone relentlessly on the way to a 48-32 drubbing of the Cowboys.

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Specifically, the split-flow action seemed to target the Cowboys’ most dynamic defensive player, Micah Parsons.

On this first example, Green Bay came out in “12” personnel with tight ends aligned to both sides of the formation. This would be a wide-zone run to the right with tight end Tucker Kraft slicing back to the left where Micah Parsons was aligned (That’s the split-flow):

You can see the effect this had on Parsons. He wasn’t able to be a factor in the play:

Also notice how that block targeted Parsons’ lower body. That was likely intentional. The Packers didn’t want him feeling comfortable planting his feet in the ground and going 100 miles per hour all afternoon. They wanted him wary of the potential for blocks like these all day. They wanted him hesitating.

On this next example, the Packers would run the same play to the left with Parsons aligned on the right:

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That’s because it turns the run game from 10-on-11 to 11 vs. 11. The defense must account for the quarterback at all times, which means offenses can use him to occupy or remove defenders and attack with more effective misdirection. Of course, there is also the read-option element that can be added to just about any run play.

The counter read run with a double “bluff” combines all of these elements.

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Since we’re talking about runs that feature mobile quarterbacks, we of course have to show one involving Lamar Jackson.

Below, you can see the play concept illustrated with the Ravens offense using a “full house” backfield/ “diamond” formation:

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The play design allows certain offensive linemen to bypass the D-lineman in front of them and quickly get to the second level. That D-lineman then gets kicked out by a pulling lineman (and sometimes they’ll take themselves completely out of the play by getting too far upfield).

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It’s a great play for taking advantage of aggressive D-linemen, countering interior blitzes, or breaking tendencies in the run game.

The type of trap I’ll talk about in this breakdown is called a “short trap.” The distinction here is that on a short trap, the pulling or trapping offensive lineman will generally block a D-lineman that is 2 gaps away or 2 defenders on the line of scrimmage away (It varies by front). A “long trap” would be 3 D-linemen/gaps (or more) away.

This example comes courtesy of Kyle Shanahan and the 2019 San Francisco 49ers. In their NFC Championship Game blow-out of the Packers that season, they ran for a staggering 285 yards on 42 carries (they had so much success on the ground that they threw just 8 passes).

San Francisco’s first big run came on their initial scoring drive. This was 3rd-and-8, an obvious passing situation. The Packers were playing man coverage in response and threatening with pressure from linebacker Za'Darius Smith in the A-Gap:

The 49ers didn't call a pass here, though. Instead, they called a trap.

As mentioned above, this can be a good play for handling inside pressure looks. That’s because it allows the play-side offensive linemen to block down and pin that inside pressure in the middle.

The play design is illustrated below. Notice the center (#63) block down on the back-side D-tackle, the left guard (#75) block down on Za’Darius Smith inside, and left tackle Joe Staley get up to the second level and pin safety Adrian Amos in the middle:

Kyler Fackrell would be the defender getting trapped on this play. Right guard Mike Person (#68) would pull and kick him out:

Fackrell was itching to rush the quarterback since this was an “obvious” passing situation. He ended up falling down after bracing for contact from Staley that never came. Then he was kicked out by Person:

With the Packers playing man coverage, many of their DB’s were too late reacting to Mostert bursting through the line of scrimmage. The result was a 36-yard touchdown run that sent the 49ers on their way to a rout:

Great call and great execution.

Check out some other variations of the Trap run by clicking on the links below:

In recent years, Ben Johnson has been as good as anyone in this department.

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This first example was a 4th-and-goal from the 2-yard line during the Lions’ 2023 Wild Card Playoff win over the Rams. Here, the personnel, formation, and route combination each gave the Lions a distinct advantage.

Detroit came out with 6 offensive linemen, 2 running backs, and 2 tight ends. This was goalline big personnel across the board. That got the Rams to match up in kind with 4 defensive linemen, 6 linebackers, and a safety. There were no cornerbacks on the field.

The Rams started in an under-center I-formation with all their personnel aligned tight:

Then they shifted to shotgun and a trips-bunch to the right. The bunch was made up of tight end Sam LaPorta, tight end Brock Wright, and fullback Jason Cabinda:

The two most athletic receiving threats on the field were LaPorta and running back David Montgomery, who had shifted to the backfield.

The Rams preferred to have linebacker Ernest Jones match up to him if he leaked out of the backfield. That left the one DB on the field (safety John Johnson) and two linebackers to handle the trips bunch:

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It’s in these short-yardage situations that defenses tend to be more aggressive. They don’t just play man coverage. They play tight-man coverage from a press position, often jamming at the line.

So offensive coordinators have to be ready to dial up their best man beaters to help their receivers create separation.

“Mesh Traffic” is one of those man-beaters.

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On the below example from this year’s AFC Championship Game, the Chiefs held a 3-point lead with 1:35 remaining. The Bills were desperate to get a stop and were treating this 3rd-and-9 as a short-yardage situation. Notice the tight-man coverage:

They were ripe for Mesh Traffic.

Below, you can see that this route concept unsurprisingly includes Mesh:

But the play is designed to go to the running back out of the backfield. His route comes from an offset position in the backfield opposite of the side he’ll release to. The idea there is to make his defender have to run across the field, and of course, fight through traffic to stay with him:

And as the name of the play indicates, traffic isn’t just something the offense is hoping to create. It’s specifically built into the play.

Here, the Chiefs aligned in a Trips-bunch formation and would use all three receivers (as well as their defenders) to create that traffic with crossing routes and inside releases:

That allowed running back Samaje Perine to outflank his defender (LB Terrel Bernard) for the game-sealing first down:

Here’s another version of Mesh Traffic from a game between the 49ers and Buccaneers in Week 11 of the 2023 season. The 49ers would also use a trips bunch look to run this out of and create traffic.

But the wrinkle here was that Kyle Shanahan would motion running back Christian McCaffrey to the outside just before the snap. That got his defender to move with him. And he was still moving in that direction at the snap, which gave McCaffrey an extra step of separation to the other side:

That type of motion is often accompanied by a route to the same side. Shanahan played off of tendency here to successfully set up this play.

This final example of Mesh Traffic comes courtesy of Bills Offensive Coordinator Joe Brady. This is as exotic of a design as you’ll see, as Brady added some nice eye candy to the play to throw the defense off the scent.

This was a 4th-and-3 during Buffalo’s Week 2 win over the Dolphins. The Bills were in a 1x3 with a Trips bunch to the left and running back James Cook offset to the same side:

While this was a high-probability man-coverage situation, Buffalo wanted to be sure. So they used motion to get an indicator.

First, Cook motioned behind Allen before coming back and settling to his right. Dolphins linebacker David Long (#11) followed:

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The key difference between Mesh Rail and Mesh is that the first read is a rail route from the backfield instead of some other route from a receiver on the outside.

Below, you can see the design of the play with the quarterback’s reads:

The hope is to get the ball to the rail route coming out of the backfield. The offense will often get a favorable matchup with the running back on a linebacker who has to fight through traffic.

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And there are generally several moments in the play when the rail route can be thrown. The quarterback can throw it immediately if it’s a hot situation or if the defender has to go over top of the traffic (depending on down and distance).

He can throw it to the back shoulder a little later in the route if he feels comfortable with the matchup and the defender has his back turned to the quarterback.

Or he can throw it over the top if the defender tries to go under the traffic and ends up chasing the receiver.

Despite having multiple options, you generally see quarterbacks forego the rail route and hit the shallow crosser from the mesh combo.

Let’s take a look at some examples below.

This first one was a 4th-and-2 for the Commanders against the Lions in the 2024 Divisional Playoffs. The Commanders led 38-28 with just 8-and-a-half minutes remaining. Convert here and the game was all but over.

The Mesh Rail design shown above was the play called here:

The Lions would play cover-0 (no deep safety) with a low-hole defender as help inside (cover-0 “funnel”) and rush 5:

The extra route in this concept is generally some kind of “alert” route. Here, it was a corner/out by Jamison Crowder. That will come into play in a bit:

Quarterback Jayden Daniels’ first read was the rail route. At the snap, however, it was clear to him that this wouldn’t be open since linebacker Alex Anzalone was able to get over top of the route and had his eyes on the quarterback. He was in great position to respond to any kind of throw to the back:

The #2 read was Terry McLaurin’s shallow crosser as a part of the mesh concept. Here’s where that alert route comes into play. Notice how it created traffic that the defender responsible for McLaurin couldn’t fight through:

Had he been able to stick with McLaurin, there was another pick/rub coming his way in the form of Zach Ertz’ crossing route from the other side:

Here, Ertz was able to prevent the low-hole defender from taking McLaurin, although he likely wouldn’t have been able to hang anyway.

Daniels quickly sorted everything out, eliminated the rail route, and got the ball to McLaurin on the shallow crosser for 12 yards and a first down:

The Commanders would put the game away with a touchdown on the next play.

Mesh Rail also made an appearance in the AFC Championship Game a week later, resulting in a 23-yard gain that set up the Chiefs’ game-winning field goal:

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Below, you can see the basic concept illustrated. The routes that define the play are two shallow crossers, generally run at 4-5 and 5-6 yards (although it can vary) from opposite sides of the field:

Against man coverage, the high crosser is meant to pick or rub or obstruct the path of of the shallow crosser’s defender. And that creates the separation.

The thing to point out is that mesh is generally part of a larger passing concept. It’s almost never the primary read. Instead, the first read is normally a route on the outside followed by the shallow crosser.

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This first example came in a Week 18 game between the Bears and Packers during the 2023 season. Chicago faced a 3rd-and-4, a high-probability man-coverage situation.

Notice the overall play design with the quarterback’s reads. This is a fairly common way of running mesh in today’s NFL:

The primary read was a double move on the outside. The shallow crosser was the #2. If those first two receivers weren’t open, quarterback Justin Fields would keep moving across the field. There was also a built-in “alert” route in case the Bears got a specific coverage or Fields loved the matchup.

That alert route was also meant to provide traffic for the shallow crosser’s defender if he chased him across the field.

The Packers would play cover-1 here, which is a great look to run this play against:

In this instance, Green Bay tried to handle mesh by passing off D.J. Moore’s shallow crosser. Cornerback Jaire Alexander stopped following Moore once he released inside, leaving the low-hole defender (linebacker Quay Walker) to pick him up:

However, Walker got caught in the traffic of the crosser coming from the other side:

That’s mesh baby. Moore was easily able to separate.

Quarterback Justin Fields looked at the double move on the outside to his left first before coming down to Moore. The result here was a 33-yard gain:

Even if Walker hadn’t gotten stuck inside there, the Packers would have had a linebacker running with a receiver in man coverage, which still isn’t ideal even though he had leverage initially.

This next example came in a critical moment of Super Bowl LVIII. There were just 16 seconds left in the game and the Chiefs trailed the 49ers by 3. This was a 3rd-and-7.

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