The route concept includes a shallow crosser, which generally removes defenders or takes their attention away from an area, and then an angle route behind it into the vacated space.

It’s effective against man or zone and can be run with the main route combo coming from a number of different areas of the formation. It can also be the primary target of a route concept or the back side of a progression.

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Probably the most common version is shown below with the angle route coming from the running back out of the backfield (the route combo is highlighted in red):

This was a game from the 2023 season between the 49ers and Cardinals. On this play, Arizona was in man coverage with two defenders ready to take running back Christian McCaffrey depending on which direction he released. They also had an extra defender in the middle to help out on any in-breaking routes:

So conceivably, the Cardinals had 3 defenders in the middle of the field ready to account for McCaffrey anywhere he released on the field.

But against this route combination, it didn’t matter. George Kittle’s shallow crosser took both his man and the help defender in the middle with him. And that created the opening for McCaffrey’s angle route:

Here’s the play in it’s entirety:

On the play above, McCaffrey’s trail route was toward the end of the progression. On this next play, the objective of the play was to target the shallow-trail.

This time, the trail/angle route would be run by a tight end near the line of scrimmage:

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In the example below, I’ll walk you through a 4-man simulated pick pressure used by Jaguars Defensive Coordinator Anthony Campanile to get a sack against the Texans last season.

Campanile did a great job of dictating the protection with his front, attacking where it was vulnerable, and using a coverage behind it that prevented any quick throws.

Let’s take a look at this from the end zone angle first. Jacksonville initially aligned in a 5-1 front with linebacker Foye Oluokun down over the right tackle:

The 3 defenders to the right of the center forced the Texans to slide in their direction. That left the back side in man protection. The running back would be responsible for linebacker Devin Lloyd (#0):

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Receivers can have different options based on the coverage, or the play can be called in the huddle with different tags, changing a specific route or two for different situations.

This makes it a versatile play that can be called against just about any coverage.

Most would probably argue that the ideal coverages to call it against are cover-3 and cover-2 since there aren’t 4 deep defenders to account for the 4 verticals. That doesn’t mean it can’t be effective against cover-4 though (more on that in a bit).

At the end of the day, the play attempts to target a deep safety in the middle of the field and put him into conflict by creating a 2-on-1 (2 verticals for one defender).

But, of course, if the quarterback loves a matchup on the outside, he always has the option to target it.

Let’s take a look at four verts vs. cover-3 first.

In cover-3, there are just 3 deep defenders for the 4 vertical routes. The safety in the middle of the field is the defender to target since he is put into that 2-on-1 conflict by the inside vertical routes:

Most teams don’t love to play cover-3 if they see a formation that can clearly threaten four verts. So offenses sometimes try to get defenses into cover-3 by aligning with big personnel and running formations before attacking vertically.

In a game between the Chargers and Bengals in Week 11 of the 2024 season, the Chargers did that brilliantly.

L.A. came out on first down in “13” personnel (1 RB, 3 TEs) and a condensed formation. It was a run look, which induced Cincinnati into cover-3:

L.A. then motioned to a 2x2 formation and called four verts, which the Bengals were likely not anticipating out of this personnel grouping and formation.

Against cover-3, the quarterback can either read that deep safety, or if he has a particular receiver inside that he prefers to target, he can move the safety with his eyes.

Here, Herbert did a great job of getting his head around quickly off of the play-action and then looking left to move the safety. That created just enough of a window for him to deliver this ball to tight end Will Dissly down the right seam:

Below is another version of the same idea.

This was from a 2019 game between Bruce Arians’ Buccaneers and the Colts. This was a 2nd-and-1 and the Bucs were in “12” personnel (1 RB, 2 TEs). They aligned in a 2x2 formation with 2 wide receivers to the right and 2 tight ends to the back side.

The defense was once again induced into a cover-3 look. The deep safety cheated to the 2 wide-receiver side since they were the more likely vertical threat. So quarterback Jameis Winston targeted his tight end to the left for a big gain:

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Therefore, it’s critical for OC’s to be able to dress up the same plays differently with a variety of formations, alignments, and motions to keep the defense from anticipating the right concept. We’ve written about this before (Post-Wheel, Spin-Dig). It’s also important to be able to do the opposite and run various plays out of the same formations.

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Another essential tactic for any playcaller is the ability to understand his team’s tendencies and find the right moments to break them. This can be done as a result of great self-scouting or from deliberately setting up certain tendencies just to pull the rug out from under the defense at the right moment.

Below are just a few of the great tendency-breaking routes and concepts I’ve seen in the NFL over the last several seasons.

On this first example from the Packers’ 2019 Divisional Round Playoff win over the Seahawks, focus on wide receivers Davante Adams and Geronimo Allison. At the snap, they appeared to be utilizing a switch-release:

This isn’t an uncommon tactic, particularly in the red zone or man-coverage situations.

Both of Seattle’s defenders were in man coverage, recognized the releases, and started to fight through the anticipated traffic:

But Adams and Allison wouldn’t actually cross paths. Instead, they took their routes back toward their initial alignment:

Both DBs took their eyes off of their receivers for a brief moment to try and fight through the switch release. By the time they realized what was happening, it was too late, and neither ended up covering anyone. The result was an easy touchdown:

This wasn’t the only tendency-breaker Packers head coach Matt LaFleur would use that night to get the win.

On this next play, he took advantage of his own tendency to run deep-over routes off of play-action. Since this was Green Bay’s 17th game of the season, he knew that Seattle was also likely aware of this tendency.

So watch how LaFleur set up the defense. First, he motioned Davante Adams toward the formation. That was a strong indicator of some kind of crossing route:

Seattle was ready for it. At the snap, Adams’ defender got depth and raced to get over top of him. The deep safety in the middle of the field dropped toward the other side of the formation in the direction Adams appeared to be headed:

Then Adams hit the breaks and turned back to the outside, leaving both defenders in the dust for another touchdown:

Adams is a pretty exceptional route-runner if you weren’t already aware.

So is Justin Jefferson. And the deep-over route is also one of his most effective routes to run for big plays. If I know this, NFL defenses certainly do too.

Below, you can see him run a similar tendency-breaker for a huge gain:

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The benefit of the personnel grouping is that it generally forces the defense to match up with base personnel (3 linebackers). That’s a big deal because in today’s NFL, most defenses rely on nickel (5 DB’s) in order to keep up with the speed and lighter personnel packages that offenses normally deploy.

That means they generally use just 2 linebackers or fewer the majority of the time, and rosters are built accordingly. The 3rd linebacker on the roster is often a non-starting-caliber player or run specialist who only comes in on early downs and short-yardage situations.

And this means an offense that can throw out of 13 personnel can exploit the weakest pass defenders on the field.

That was something the Rams were able to do all season. But in Week 10 in particular, they took advantage of a 49ers defense that had lost its best linebacker for the year (Fred Warner) and had a depth chart that was extremely thin at the position as a result.

San Francisco was forced to play with 3 linebackers on the field for much of the afternoon, and that included their 3rd and 4th linebackers on the depth chart to start the season (#48 Tatum Bethune #57 and Luke Gifford #57).

The Rams attacked those backers through the air with play-action, which they called on a staggering 51.4% of all dropbacks. Unsurprisingly, they had a ton of success.

Just check out the below play as an example. First, notice the 13 personnel and the 49ers matching up in base (3 LB’s):

L.A. motioned tight end Terrance Ferguson across the formation right before the snap and had a post-wheel called:

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You can see a great example from the Super Bowl champion Seahawks below. First, watch Demarcus Lawrence (#0) and Boye Mafe (#53) signal to each other before the snap:

The stunt was on.

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Sometimes, that’s not a good option, especially if playing against a quarterback who can use his legs but predominantly plays from the pocket.

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So what’s the best way to play defense against these quarterbacks and keep their legs from killing you without making it easier for them to throw from the pocket?

The Seahawks defense had a pretty good answer last season with their 4-man rush.

There were two key aspects to their approach. First, their pass rushers were conscious of not getting too far upfield, particularly on the edges. They rushed at the depth of the quarterback, helping to prevent the emergence of any escape lanes.

Second, they brought lots of stunts inside to create chaos in the middle, break down the O-line’s interior, and minimize the existence of any clean escape routes in front of the quarterback.

Let’s take a look at some examples below.

This first play comes from Seattle’s Week 9 win over the Commanders and is a perfect illustration of what I described above. This was a 4-man rush with a stunt in the middle and the edge rushers never getting past Jayden Daniels:

Of course this wasn’t a pass rush merely designed to contain Daniels and do nothing else. It was still meant to get to the quarterback.

Watch Leonard Williams (#99) deliver a powerful blow to the center, knocking him out of the middle. That allowed him to penetrate inside and get pressure on Daniels, who had nowhere to escape:

Take another look from the sideline angle to see the depth of those edge rushers. They never got further upfield than Daniels:

You can see the Seahawks do the same thing against Kyler Murray on this sack:

I guess you could say Uchenna Nwosu (#7) got pushed a little bit past Murray, but not by much:

He never got deeper than the top of Murray’s drop and was clearly conscious of not getting too far upfield. That allowed Nwosu to remain under control and ultimately get to him for the sack.

Below is an example of another way that Seattle was able to get pressure inside and smother the quarterback.

This was a 3rd-and-9 against Trevor Lawrence and the Jaguars in Week 6. The Seahawks used a tilted front here with 3 down-linemen to the left of the center:

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Joe Burrow is among the best in the game at doing just that, as you’ll see on the example below.

In the Bengals’ Week 13 win over the Ravens last season, they faced a 3rd-and-9 from Baltimore’s 29-yard line in the 3rd quarter.

Cincinnati initially came out in a 2x2 formation with running back Samaje Perine on the perimeter and tight end Drew Sample next to Burrow in the backfield:

But Burrow saw the Ravens showing a pressure look with 7 defenders hovering near the line of scrimmage and an 8th potential rusher in the slot to his right:

Given the situation and defensive look, a blitz was likely. But it could be coming from either direction.

So Burrow brought Perine back in from the perimeter and moved Sample up just behind the center to account for it. He was keeping 7 in to protect:

The route concept the Bengals had called here was “Dagger” with just 3 receivers running routes:

Since the route concept was to the offense’s right, that meant Burrow’s eyes needed to go right at the snap as well.

In an ideal world, a quarterback does not want to have to peak in one direction and then get his eyes back to the other side in order to decipher the coverage and work through his reads. That adds time and can be hard to do.

So Burrow put Sample in the A-gap to the left and set the protection so that he was completely secure to his back side and wouldn’t have to peak in that direction:

But after Burrow set the protection, you can see the Ravens communicating and adjusting their blitz. The slot cornerback to the right, Marlon Humphrey, crept inside ready to rush:

That wasn’t a problem for Burrow.

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However, defenders are also human. They can get lulled into a pattern. In fact, the best defenders are always looking for opportunities to call out plays before they happen and stop the offense in its tracks.

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So it helps to feed them the same look over and over and over again, set up a tendency, and then pull the rug out from the defense at just the right moment using play-action.

In Super Bowl LX, Seahawks Offensive Coordinator Klint Kubiak did just that, patiently calling run after run out of the same looks before breaking tendency for a back-breaking touchdown.

The trend that Kubiak established early on, and then throughout the game, was that the Seahawks would run outside zone to the 2-tight-end side if they were in 12 or 13 personnel. They did it out of static looks and they did it off of motion.

It started on the very first play of the game. Watch Kenneth Walker III take this to the 2-tight-end side and pick up 10 yards to get the Seahawks offense going:

On these next two examples, Kubiak motioned his tight end across the formation and then ran outside zone to the 2-tight-end side.

But pay close attention to Patriots linebacker Jack Gibbens (#51) on both plays. Notice how he attacked downhill right at the snap when he saw the motion, ready to defend the run:

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This 3rd-and-9 on New England’s opening drive set the tone. Macdonald would bring a 5-man double-edge blitz that ultimately yielded a free rusher vs. a 6-man protection.

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One key to this pressure was that the Seahawks had Dime personnel (6 DB’s) on the field, and that enabled them to have speed off of both edges. The presence of speed allowed them to hold their disguise until the last moment and blitz from distance.

First, take a look at this from the sideline angle. The Patriots motioned to a 3x1 formation. The Seahawks responded with a 2-shell look pre-snap (as they did for most of the night), 5 men on the line of scrimmage, Devon Witherspoon in the slot far away from the pressure look, and safety Nick Emmanwori lurking off the edge to the other side:

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This example came against the Chargers in Week 1 of the 2025 season on a 2nd-and-7 from L.A.’s own 29-yard line. That’s an area of the field and a situation where you rarely see cover-0 pressure.

First, notice how the Chiefs hid their intentions pre-snap against L.A.’s shotgun 1-back set. There were no hints that a cover-0 blitz was coming here:

However, there were two clues that the Chiefs might be bringing some kind of pressure.

Linebacker Nick Bolton (#32) was hovering near the line of scrimmage. And to the offense’s right, the safety was stacked over cornerback Trent McDuffie (#22). It almost seemed like Spagnuolo wanted the Chargers to see the blitz coming from the right:

From the end zone angle, you can see how the Chargers would block this. Their 5 O-linemen would account for the 5 most dangerous defenders (the 4 down linemen and Bolton):

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In this breakdown, I’ll talk about Baker Mayfield’s 28-yard completion to Emeka Egbuka that set up the Buccaneers’ game-winning field goal against the Jets in Week 3 last season.

His ability to decipher the blitz and set the protection accordingly are what made this play possible.

This was a 2nd-and-10 with just 1:36 remaining and Tampa trailing 27-26. The Buccaneers started in a 3x1 but shifted to a 2x2 well before the snap:

Notice the Jets’ defensive look. They had 6 men on the line of scrimmage, including two linebackers in the A-gaps. And they had a slot-corner over Tampa’s #2 inside receiver to the right. He was also a potential blitz threat:

That clearly triggered something in Mayfield’s mind.

In fact, earlier in the game, the Jets had shown a similar look in another obvious passing situation (a 3rd-and-9). Notice the linebackers in both A-gaps and 6 men on the line of scrimmage on that play as well:

The Jets would bring pressure with the slot corner blitzing and the A-Gap linebacker to his side dropping out:

The Bucs protected this as illustrated below with the slot corner unaccounted for. Baker would have to throw hot off of him:

Mayfield’s hot throw was taken away by the coverage. Not to mention, the blitzing slot-corner was in his face, obstructing the throw. The Jets would drop Mayfield for a sack as a result:

Fast forward to that 2nd-and-10 on the Buccaneers’ final drive. The pressure look was similar, but it appeared the slot blitz would be coming from Mayfield’s right this time (note the safety’s position over him as a tell):

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Well, it kind of says it in the name. The defense simulates pressure or simulates a blitz (5 or more pass rushers) by giving a pre-snap presentation to the offense that makes it look like pressure is coming.

Ultimately, however, the defense will only rush 4. At least one of those 4 pass rushers will be a non-traditional rusher (e.g. a linebacker or defensive back).

Generally, the defense will try to bring 4 pass rushers in a way that is either difficult for the offense to pick up or creates advantageous 1-on-1’s (or leaves the offense vulnerable to stunts). And because only 4 are rushing, the defense is not sacrificing defenders in coverage. So just about anything can be played behind the pressure.

Sounds like the perfect defense, no? Often times, it is.

The examples below come courtesy of Packers Defensive Coordinator Jeff Hafley from Green Bay’s Week 7 win over the Texans last season.

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They can be great plays for picking up easy yards against the right look, particularly on early downs. Or, as was the case on this play below, they can be used as good answers for certain blitzes in obvious passing situations:

You can read about the sequence that led to the above completion and see how masterful Tom Brady was at the line of scrimmage here.

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I’m not going to lie to you, though, the arrow screen itself is not all that exciting. What is exciting, however, is how it can be used with bluffs or fakes to catch the defense with its pants down.

You can see an example of this below courtesy of Aaron Rodgers during the Packers’ 2022 Week 10 overtime win against the Cowboys.

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It might vary by opponent or situation, but by and large, the defenders in man coverage will play with outside leverage on routes between the numbers and funnel their receivers inside where the help is. Notice all three of the DBs on this particular example (in red) playing to their help in the middle:

Those help defenders try to read the route combination and the quarterback. Here, the hole defender was able to track the routes and the quarterback’s eyes and then make a play on the ball for the interception:

The Buccaneers offense used reduced splits on this play (receivers inside the numbers). But for an offense that aligns with receivers outside the numbers, the defenders matching up to them will generally play with inside leverage and use the sideline as their help:

On this example, let’s focus on those outside cornerbacks. Pre-snap, one was aligned inside and the other was aligned outside of his receiver. But both would ultimately play with inside leverage, taking away the middle of the field and forcing their receivers to the sideline:

The slot defenders inside the numbers would play with outside leverage, funneling their receivers to the middle:

This play was interesting, though, because the defender over the #3 inside receiver (safety C.J. Gardner-Johnson) wouldn’t follow his receiver inside. Instead, he let him go and the hole defender locked onto him:

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The concept is illustrated below:

The route that attacks downfield is traditionally a go-route (there are variations, which we’ll get into). The sail, which is a rounded-off out-route, attacks the intermediate level. The shallow route is generally anything that attacks the flat area. That can be done from the backfield (e.g. a flat route or swing route), via a receiver running a shallow crosser from the opposite side of the field, or from a quick out to the same side as the concept.

This first example is from the Eagles’ 2022 season with Shane Steichen as the offensive coordinator. Philadelphia would run the concept out of a 2x2 formation. The Steelers would rotate to a Cover-3 zone post-snap:

The go-route on the outside would hold the deep-third corner and the flat route coming out of the backfield would hold the flat defender. That left tight end Dallas Goedert running his sail-route into a vacated zone:

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It’s hard to find a better example of this than Week 2 of the 2024 season when Texans Head Coach DeMeco Ryans was able to torment Caleb Williams and the Chicago Bears with one blitz after another out of this front.

First, let’s take a look at the front so we can understand why it can be so effective. Notice the 3 defensive linemen positioned to one side of the center:

Multiple pass rushers to the 3-man side are often assured a 1-on-1 matchup out of this alignment.

When a 5th defender (a linebacker or safety) drops down onto the line of scrimmage, it often forces the O-line into man blocking and 1-on-1’s across the board. That makes it more difficult for the protection to handle any stunts since there’s no extra blocker to help out.

As you’ll see on the examples below, it was these 5-man tilted front looks that Ryans used over and over on this night to generate immense pressure.

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There are many variations and ways to get to it, but at its core, the play involves a wide receiver or tight end blocking down (cracking) on the EMOL and the tackle pulling around him to the outside.

More often than not, there are multiple receivers or skill-position players cracking, and sometimes there will be multiple players pulling. The hope is that getting the running back to the perimeter quickly will allow him to take advantage of space and create a big play.

In this breakdown, I’ll show you a standard example of toss crack, a variation where the offense used motion to create better blocking angles, and an example from the 2024 NFC Championship Game where the Eagles used personnel and formation to give themselves a huge advantage when executing the play.

Below, you can see one version of the concept illustrated:

The run is, for the most part, blocked like outside zone with the exception of the pin-and-pull action of the skill players on the perimeter and the pullers. Here, it gained an easy 7 yards on first down:

The great thing about the play is that it’s not dependent on the key players delivering devastating blocks or dominating the line of scrimmage (although both of those would certainly be preferred). Instead, it’s about angles.

You could see on the run above that the tight end cracking on the line of scrimmage finished 4 yards into the backfield and the receiver cracking to that side caught his man and was basically taken for a ride. The play still picked up 7 yards on a running down.

A big part of the play is the tackle getting matched up on a cornerback. Most corners (like #23 below) want absolutely no part of that and are more than happy to get the hell out of the way, widening the running lane:

You’ll often see teams run toss crack and try to get multiple blockers on the perimeter. Above, the Texans did so with a fullback out of the backfield. This next example, courtesy of Mike McDaniel and the Dolphins, used burst motion before the snap:

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One blitzer picks or blocks an offensive lineman, creating an alley for another blitzer to get through to the quarterback.

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This example comes courtesy of Mike Macdonald when he was the Ravens Defensive Coordinator in 2023.

This was a 3rd-and-10. Baltimore aligned with 6 potential pass rushers near the line of scrimmage. Linebacker Roquan Smith stood over the center, creating a 5-man surface:

The Jaguars matched up with their 5 offensive linemen accounting for Baltimore’s 5 defenders on the line of scrimmage. Running back D’Ernest Johnson would be responsible for linebacker Patrick Queen if he blitzed:

Now let’s take a look at the design of the stunt. Roquan Smith crossed the center’s face to the left at the snap, taking him with him:

Kyle Van Noy took his initial path to the right, taking right guard Brandon Scherff with him and splitting the middle wide open:

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One of the best examples of a team having success with this tactic occurred during the 2023 NFC Wild Card Playoffs. Packers Head Coach Matt LaFleur called split zone relentlessly on the way to a 48-32 drubbing of the Cowboys.

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Specifically, the split-flow action seemed to target the Cowboys’ most dynamic defensive player, Micah Parsons.

On this first example, Green Bay came out in “12” personnel with tight ends aligned to both sides of the formation. This would be a wide-zone run to the right with tight end Tucker Kraft slicing back to the left where Micah Parsons was aligned (That’s the split-flow):

You can see the effect this had on Parsons. He wasn’t able to be a factor in the play:

Also notice how that block targeted Parsons’ lower body. That was likely intentional. The Packers didn’t want him feeling comfortable planting his feet in the ground and going 100 miles per hour all afternoon. They wanted him wary of the potential for blocks like these all day. They wanted him hesitating.

On this next example, the Packers would run the same play to the left with Parsons aligned on the right:

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